Hosni & Gamal & Omar & Us

Our guest columnist this afternoon posted this from the American embassy in Cairo on May 14, 2007.

Presidential succession is the elephant in the room of Egyptian politics. Despite incessant whispered discussions, no one in Egypt has any certainty about who will succeed Mubarak, or how the succession will happen. Mubarak himself seems to be trusting to God and the inertia of the military and civilian security services to ensure an orderly transition. In the current political framework, the most likely contenders are presidential son Gamal Mubarak (whose profile is ever-increasing at the ruling National Democratic Party), [Egyptian General Intelligence Service] chief Omar Suleiman, dark horse Arab League secretary general Amre Moussa, or an as-yet unknown military officer. Whoever ends up as Egypt’s next president likely will be politically weaker than Mubarak. Once Mubarak’s successor has assumed the post, his first priority will be to build popular support. We thus expect that the new president will likely adopt an anti-American tone in his initial public rhetoric, in an effort to prove his nationalist bona fides to the Egyptian street, and may possibly extend an olive branch to the Muslim Brotherhood, as did previous Egyptian presidents at the beginning of their terms…

Cairene conventional wisdom holds that Gamal wants the job, despite his repeated denials to the contrary. The most recent such abjuration was on May 2, during an interview with the Orbit satellite TV channel, when Gamal stated that, “I do not have the intention and ambition to run for president… Whatever the party says does not matter. I am not looking for any executive post.” Such coy demurrals ring hollow in the face of his increasingly robust role within the NDP (far exceeding that of his counterparts in the party hierarchy), his apparently central role in creating new legislation, and his recent tours to various governorates featuring ministerial entourages. It is hard to argue that Gamal is not being groomed for the presidency…

A key stumbling block for a Gamal candidacy could be the military. Each of Egypt’s four presidents since 1952 arose from the officer corps, and the military has historically been the ultimate guarantor of the president’s rule. Gamal did not serve as a military officer, and we believe he did not complete his compulsory service. Many observers opine that timing is the crucial factor for a potential Gamal presidency — his power base is his father, and so while he could conceivably be installed prior to Mubarak’s death, the task would become far more difficult, although not insurmountable, once the pharaoh has departed the scene, and personal loyalties to him are in the past. Although there is widespread popular animus against a Gamal candidacy, with many Egyptians opining proudly that, “We are not Syria or Saudi!”, The NDP machinery could likely stage an electoral victory, based on poor voter turnout, sloppy voter lists, and state control of the election apparatus.

Egyptian intelligence chief and Mubarak consigliere, in past years Suleiman was often cited as likely to be named to the long-vacant vice-presidential post. In the past two years, Suleiman has stepped out of the shadows, and allowed himself to be photographed, and his meetings with foreign leaders reported. Many of our contacts believe that Suleiman, because of his military background, would at the least have to figure in any succession scenario for Gamal, possibly as a transitional figure. Suleiman himself adamantly denies any personal ambitions, but his interest and dedication to national service is obvious. His loyalty to Mubarak seems rock-solid. At age 71, he could be attractive to the ruling apparatus and the public at large as a reliable figure unlikely to harbor ambitions for another multi-decade presidency. A key unanswered question is how he would respond to a Gamal presidency once Mubarak is dead. An alleged personal friend of Suleiman tells us that Suleiman “detests” the idea of Gamal as president, and that he also was “deeply personally hurt” by Mubarak, who promised to name him vice-president several years ago, but then reneged…

Whoever Egypt’s next president is, he will inevitably be politically weaker than Mubarak, and once he has assumed the post, among his first priorities will be to cement his position and build popular support. We can thus anticipate that the new president may sound an initial anti-American tone in his public rhetoric, in an effort to prove his nationalist bona fides to the Egyptian street, and distance himself from Mubarak’s policies. If history is any guide, we can also expect the new president to extend an olive branch to the Muslim Brotherhood, as did Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar el Sadat, and Mubarak early in all of their terms, in an effort to co-opt potential opposition, and boost popularity.

Cable 07CAIRO1417, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION IN EGYPT [WikiLeaks, via Harry Shearer]